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O
ver the last ten years, there has been an explo-
sion in the availability of mortgage credit for 
low- and moderate-income and minority bor-
rowers who have less than perfect credit. The 
emergence of a robust subprime mortgage market has al-
lowed many with imperfect credit to take out higher-priced 
loans that allow them to become homeowners. Subprime 
lending is no longer a small problem that affects only a few 
homeowners. In 2005, one in every four home loans origi-
nated was a subprime loan, and there are $1.2 trillion in 
subprime mortgages currently outstanding.2 In recent years 
the subprime market has seen a rapid introduction of non-
traditional products, including interest only and payment-
option  adjustable  rate  mortgages.  Another  relatively  new 
product in the subprime market is the hybrid ARM, with 
fixed teaser rates, but sharp payment increases when it be-
comes an ARM.
Because many subprime lenders fail to consider whether 
the borrower will be able to afford the mortgage payment 
after the ARM adjusts, households with these loans are likely 
to face increasing rates of foreclosure and will lose signifi-
cant accumulated equity in the coming years. The impact 
will not only be on those who lose their homes because the 
prices of neighboring homes are also affected by foreclo-
sures. These loans will have a particularly damaging impact 
on communities of color, where consumers are dispropor-
tionately likely to borrow in the subprime market. Accord-
ing to the most recent HMDA data issued by the Federal 
Reserve, a majority of loans to African-American borrowers 
were so-called “higher-rate” loans,3 while four in ten loans to 
Latino4 borrowers were higher-rate. Worse, many borrowers 
who receive subprime loans could have qualified for a more 
affordable and responsible product in the first place.5
In this article, we examine three key features of the sub-
prime credit market that we believe are particularly harmful 
to low-income borrowers, and provide policy recommen-
dations for state and federal regulators. The need to act is 
urgent, and the likely damage caused by high-risk ARMs in 
the subprime market is real. Nontraditional mortgages in the 
subprime market are acting to reverse the traditional benefits 
conveyed by mortgages, leaving vulnerable families worse 
off rather than giving them the opportunity to become more 
financially secure.
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I. “Exploding ARMs”: Hybrid ARMs in the subprime 
market result in payment increases that borrowers will 
not be able to afford. 
 Sometimes referred to as “exploding ARMs” due to the 
significant  increase  in  the  monthly  payment  after  an  in-
troductory period with an artificially low payment, hybrid 
ARMs and hybrid interest-only ARMs have become “the 
main staples of the subprime sector.”6 Hybrid ARMs made 
up 81 percent of the subprime sector’s securitization in the 
first half of 2006, up from 64 percent in 2002.7 The most 
common type of hybrid ARM is a 2/28, which is a two-year 
fixed rate loan with an artificially low “teaser” rate for the 
initial two years of the loan, followed by rate adjustments 
that occur every six months for the remaining 28 years of the 
loan. The initial reset of the loan after two years results in 
a large payment “shock” for borrowers even if interest rates 
decline over that period. (See Figure 3.1)
While interest-only loans are clearly of concern, repre-
senting one in four subprime loans,8 the even more common 
2/28 subprime mortgages themselves pose a significant risk 
to families. The low initial rate virtually guarantees that pay-
ments will rise significantly when the rate resets, even if in-
terest rates remain constant and do not rise at all. Of course, 
if interest rates rise, the payment shock will worsen.
The Center for Responsible Lending is particularly con-
cerned  that  payment  shock  for  borrowers  with  subprime 
loans will be widespread in the next two years. According 
to Barron’s, by 2008 reset of two-year teaser rates on hybrid 
ARMs will lead to increased monthly payments on an esti-
mated $600 billion of subprime mortgages.9 Fitch Ratings has 
stated that in 2006 payments would increase on 41 percent 
of the outstanding subprime loans—29 percent of subprime 
loans are scheduled for an initial rate reset and another 12 
percent of subprime loans will face a periodic readjustment.
II. Exploding ARMs violate the fundamental underwrit-
ing precept that lenders should consider the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan.
Lenders who make exploding ARMs often do not con-
sider whether the borrower will be able to pay when the 
loan’s interest rate resets, setting the borrower up for failure. 
Subprime lenders’ public disclosures indicate that they are 
qualifying borrowers at or near the initial start rate, even 
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rate, and therefore monthly payments, will rise significant-
ly.10 As shown above, at the end of the introductory teaser 
rate on an ARM, borrowers may face a large jump in costs, 
particularly if interest rates rise. 
A lender’s failure to account for the incredible payment 
shock that most borrowers with an exploding ARM will face 
is compounded by three other practices.
Limited Use of Escrow Accounts: Most subprime lend-
ers sell loans based on low monthly payments that do 
not take taxes or insurance into account.11 According 
to industry sources, only one in four subprime loans 
includes an escrow or impoundment account for prop-
erty taxes and insurance payments.12 In contrast, it is 
common practice in the prime market to escrow taxes 
and insurance and to consider those costs when look-
ing at the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio and ability 
to repay.
Stated  Income  Loans  Often  Overstate  Borrowers’ 
Incomes: Inadequate documentation of a borrower’s 
income only compounds the problem of underwriting 
based on the borrower’s ability to make payments before 
adjustment.  In  reviewing  a  sample  of  stated  income 
loans, the Mortgage Asset Research Institute recently 
found that over 90 percent of the loans in the sample 
were underwritten using borrower incomes that were in-
flated by 5 percent or more, and almost 60 percent had 
exaggerated income by more than 50 percent.13 
Prepayment  Penalties  Either  Strip  Equity  or  Trap 
Borrowers in Subprime Loans: The typical inclusion 
of prepayment penalties in subprime mortgages fur-
ther compounds the problems of exploding ARMs.   
Approximately two-thirds of subprime loans include a 
penalty14 for paying the loan off before a certain period, 
trapping the borrower in the loan when they might be 
able to refinance into a better product. Borrowers who 
conclude that they would be better off escaping a sub-
prime hybrid ARM (before the rate reset makes it unaf-
fordable) and shifting into a fixed rate product, for exam-
ple, must sacrifice significant equity to pay the penalty. 
III. Because subprime lenders are placing borrowers in 
loans that they objectively cannot repay, families are los-
ing their homes to foreclosure in ever greater numbers.
Lenders’ failure to ensure that borrowers can afford their 
monthly payment when their loans adjust means that bor-
rowers have one of three options when interest rates reset: 
refinance, sell the house, or face foreclosure. As families 
lose home equity and housing markets slow, foreclosure will 
become the only option for many. 
Strong  housing  price  appreciation  on  the  coasts  and 
largely favorable interest rates have prevented widespread 
defaults and foreclosures to date, though the cooling market 
has led to rapid increases in foreclosures in certain markets, 
including California.15 Until recently, most subprime bor-
rowers could refinance, usually into another subprime loan, 
though borrowers would lose significant equity as they incur 
a whole new set of lender fees, broker fees, and third-party 
closing fees with each loan. In turn, this loss of equity means 
that the borrower loses their single largest source of wealth 
and ends up trapped in a cycle of subprime loan after sub-
prime loan.
However, as interest rates begin to increase and hous-
ing  markets  slow,  the  option  to  refinance  is  in  danger 





















Monthly Payment (Principle and Interest) Post-Tax Debt-to-Income Ratio
Figure 3.1
2/28 Mortgages With Low “Teaser Rates” 
Can Result in Large Increases in Monthly 
Payments and Debt-to-Income Ratios 
Note: This assumes a 2 percent rise  
in the market index rate.  
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a significant rise in foreclosures. A study by researchers at the 
University of North Carolina has shown that “ARMs have 
a strong association with heightened foreclosure risk and 
potential loss of borrowers’ homes,” finding that subprime 
ARMs were 49 percent more likely to foreclose than fixed-
rate subprime loans after controlling for other differences in 
loan terms, creditworthiness, and economic conditions.16 In 
addition, there is a well-documented relationship that shows 
that foreclosures increase as housing appreciation slows.17
There is already evidence that borrowers with subprime 
loans cannot sustain payments as rates reset. According to 
delinquency data from the Mortgage Bankers Association, 
in the fourth quarter of 2005 the delinquency rate (90+ 
days) for subprime ARMs was 2.71 percent, compared with 
0.37 percent for prime ARMs, more than 7 times higher. In 
addition, in 18 states, more than 15 percent of homeowners 
with subprime ARMs were behind in their payments in the 
second quarter.18 An astounding 11.32 percent of the sub-
prime ARMs in Ohio were in foreclosure at the end of the 
second quarter of 2005.19
Up to now, borrowers have largely been able to offset 
lost equity from fees and prepayment penalties by selling 
their homes in a hot market or by refinancing. However, as 
home prices flatten, borrowers will be less likely to have the 
options of selling or refinancing. With these options off the 
table, borrowers who hit the rate reset wall will only have the 
option of going into foreclosure.
IV. Federal and state regulators can and should address 
this problem now.
While brokers, lenders and secondary market investors 
have profited from the rapid growth in subprime lending, 
borrowers bear the greatest risks associated with what are 
often unsuitable and unsustainable loans. Immediate action 
is needed by mortgage regulators, policymakers and lending 
institutions to mitigate the likely damage associated with 
these exploding ARMs. For example, lenders and servicers 
must act to prevent widespread foreclosures by providing 
concessions to borrowers who cannot meet their loan terms, 
such as loan modifications, reductions in payments and low/
no cost refinancing while waiving prepayment penalties. 
Federal and state regulators must also act more proac-
tively  to  protect  borrowers.  In  September,  2006,  federal 
banking regulators issued guidance on nontraditional mort-
gages.  (See  Article:  Nontraditional  Mortgage  Guidance) 
However, this guidance has two serious shortcomings. First, 
because the guidance can be read to have narrowly defined 
“nontraditional mortgages,” regulators need to confirm that 
the  guidance  applies  to  2/28  exploding  ARMs.  Second,   
the guidance only applies to mortgages made by federally 
Box 3.1 HOEPA Hearings
This past summer the Federal Reserve Board held a series of hearings under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act (HOEPA), which was enacted in 1994 in response to reports of predatory home equity lending practices in under-
served markets. HOEPA amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to impose additional disclosure requirements and limits 
on certain high-cost, home-secured loans. HOEPA also directs the Board to periodically hold public hearings to examine 
the home equity lending market and the adequacy of existing regulatory and legislative provisions for protecting the inter-
ests of consumers, particularly low-income consumers.
The Board’s 2006 hearings focused on three topics: (1) predatory lending and the impact of the HOEPA rules, and state 
and local anti-predatory lending laws on the subprime market; (2) nontraditional mortgage products such as interest only 
mortgage loans and payment option adjustable rate mortgages, and reverse mortgages; and (3) how consumers select 
lenders and mortgage products in the subprime mortgage market. 
The Board heard from consumers, consumer advocacy organizations, lenders and others on a number of issues concerning 
consumer protection, financial education, the mortgage lending market and regulatory reforms. Transcripts of the hearings 
can be found on the Board’s website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/default.htm.  
As home prices flatten, borrowers will 
be less likely to have the options of 
selling or refinancing. 
17 December 2006regulated entities. The Conference of State Bank Supervi-
sors- American Association of Residential Mortgage Regula-
tors (CSBS-AARMR) has issued guidance that mirrors the 
federal guidance but is intended to apply to state-chartered 
financial institutions and state licensed-mortgage brokers. 
It is expected that forty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia will issue the model guidance in some form. That 
guidance, unfortunately, retains the ambiguity present in the 
federal guidance. 
Bank regulators need to immediately clamp down on these 
abusive subprime products. Specifically, we recommend that:
1.   The federal banking agencies should confirm that their 
recent guidance applies to subprime ARMs for which 
there is a significant risk of payment shock. 
2.   States  that  issue  the  guidance  developed  by  CSBS-
AARMR likewise should make clear that the guidance 
applies to subprime exploding ARMs.
3.   Through  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  rulemaking  au-
thority under the Home Ownership and Equity Protec-
tion Act (HOEPA), the Federal Reserve should adopt 
an “ability to repay” standard that ensures borrowers are 
reasonably likely to be able to repay an ARM after it 
adjusts. This standard should at a minimum consider 
the fully adjusted interest rate and the full debt repre-
sented by the mortgage, including taxes and insurance, 
and it should also consider the borrower’s debt in rela-
tion to his/her reasonably verified income.20 (See Box 
3.1: HOEPA Hearings)
Conclusion 
Mortgages are complex financial transactions, and are 
among the most important that most families enter. If bro-
kers and lenders are permitted to market high-risk products 
without considering the homeowner’s ability to repay, there 
are serious consequences for individual families. Ultimate-
ly, these consequences will affect entire communities—and 
entire communities will be left out in the cold.
State and federal policymakers and regulators can and 
should  address  this  problem  now  by  requiring  that  sub-
prime lenders evaluate the borrower’s ability to repay before 
making a mortgage loan, and also by strengthening enforce-
ment against unscrupulous actors who convince homeown-
ers to accept these loans that set homeowners up to fail. 
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